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I. Introduction 
An agreement on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) may place numerical 
and geographical limits on more than 140,000 treaty-limited items (TLIs)1 in 21 
countries. Monitoring limits on such huge numbers of TLIs would be extremely 
difficult, as well as expensive and intrusive, with human inspectors alone. This 
chapter examines a promising way to effectively monitor limits while reducing cost 
and intrusiveness: the tagging of TLIs. The use of tags transforms a numerical limit 
into a ban on untagged items. The result is that many of the verification advantages 
of a complete ban can be retained for a numerical limit. 
 Tagging works by certifying that every TLI observed is one of those permitted 
under a numerical limit. A tagging system would involve the manufacture of a 
number of tags equal to the number of TLI, which would then be affixed to an 
essential part of each allowed TLI. If even one untagged TLI were ever seen—during 
on-site inspections (OSI), by national technical means (NTM), or even by nationals 
of the inspected party loyal to the treaty regime—then there would be prima facie 
evidence of a treaty violation. If properly designed, tags could also identify a TLI as 
belonging to a particular nation or as normally deployed in a particular region, which 
would make it easier to verify CFE sub-limits on national and regional deployments. 
 Other methods of counting a deployed force can only suggest that the allowed 
total is being exceeded, an indication that is unlikely to be conclusive and which 
might tend instead to cast doubt on the information going into the count. Tagging 
produces a much stronger impetus for political action in the event of a violation, 
because observation of an untagged system would provide unambiguous evidence of 
an overall violation. Since tagging allows the inventory of TLIs to be sampled, high 
confidence can be obtained with a smaller number of inspections. 
 All verification procedures have a common goal: to raise the political risk, the 
technical difficulty and the economic cost of cheating. No system can eliminate all 
possibility of cheating, but cheating can at least be made risky, difficult and 
expensive. For example, tags could not discover hidden stockpiles of undeclared 
weapons, but they could make it impossible to mix those weapons with tagged 
weapons. Depending on the facilities that would be open to inspection, this system of 
production, assembly, storage, testing, training, repair and deployment for its secret 
stockpile. Not only would the economic cost of such covert stockpiles be much higher 
than that of allowed TLI, but the risk of being caught—simply by an accident that 
exposed an undeclared TLI to the light of day—could well outweigh any military 
advantage that might otherwise have been gained from the undeclared inventory.  
   
 
II. General characteristics of tags 
 
Tagging systems have three key ingredients: a number of tags equal to the allowed 
number of TLI, a mechanism for associating a tag with a particular TLI and a 
protocol for verifying the authenticity of the tags. In most applications, checking tags 
would be an aspect of on-site inspections, but systems are conceivable in which the 
authenticity of tags would be checked remotely. Tagging systems should have the 




It must be impossible to counterfeit the tag without detection (or counterfeiting must 
be prohibitively expensive). Otherwise, the monitored party could simply produce 
counterfeit tags to cover TLI deployed in excess of the limit.  
 To make it more difficult for the monitored party to learn how to copy tags, the 
tags could be replaced at intervals with ones using different anticounterfeiting 
techniques. There is great scope for using very subtle features of tags to prevent their 
duplication if some fraction of the provided tags could be recovered and tested in a 
laboratory. Such subtle features could include altered isotopic composition of a 
particular element in a particular part of the tag, the deposit of a monoclonal antigen 
within a fiber, or seemingly random imperfections in a printing or manufacturing 
process. In some cases, the anticounterfeiting schemes that have been developed to 
protect national currencies could be used. A nation attempting to counterfeit such 
tags could never be sure that the copy duplicated all the identifying characteristics of 
the tag. As a test before a tagging system was agreed upon, a prize could be offered 




It must be impossible to spoof the tagging system, or to fool it into thinking that a 
valid tag exists where there actually is none. For example, it must be impossible to 
reroute signals between the tag reader and a counterfeit tag so that the tag reader 
would actually receive a return signal from a valid tag at another location. Although 
preventing spoofing would be straightforward if an inspector had direct access to the 





It must not be possible to move the tag from one TLI to another without the 
knowledge of the monitoring party. Tags need not be unremovable—they must only 
indicate in some obvious way that they had been removed. If tag swapping was 
possible, then valid tags could simply be moved to TLI being inspected at a 
particular time and place, or at least to those systems more susceptible to inspection 
   
 
by the other side. The tag should be placed on an essential part of the TLI, such as 
the turret of a tank, the gun barrel of an artillery piece, or the engine block of an 
armoured personnel carrier, so that a limit on that component is nearly equivalent to 
a limit on the entire TLI. If tags were glued onto TLIs, it could be arranged for part 
of the tag to change color or melt if exposed to the solvent required for the glue 
employed. An analog is in use in the U.S. domestic economy: to discourage the illegal 
parts business, cars now are made with serial number tags glued to their major sheet 




The tag should reveal only that information required for verification. In other words, 
tags should not be agents of espionage that collect sensitive data about the TLI or its 
deployment patterns. Parties might be unwilling, for example, to emplace tags that 
could reveal low rates of readiness previously unknown to the other side.  
 In particular, the tagging system must not aid the monitoring party in locating 
TLI in real-time, since this could render tagged TLI vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. 
Such position information might even allow terminally guided munitions to home on 
the tags during an attack. For example, a radio beacon attached to tanks would 
certainly allow them to be counted by satellite receivers, but it could also allow 
attacking warheads to home on those targets. 
 Concerns about espionage could be alleviated if the physical details of the tags 
were exhaustively disclosed to the monitored party, but this would restrict the use of 
sensitive technologies and may make the tags easier to copy or spoof. On the other 
hand, the use of open tag technology would make it easier to publicize evidence of 
treaty violations, since no sensitive sources or methods would be compromised.  
 The monitored party could also be reassured by providing twice the number of 
tags, half of which could be selected at random, disassembled, and returned. It would 
be impossible to verify that there were no secret aspects of the tag (as noted above, 
some subtle secret aspects would be useful to prevent counterfeiting), but it should be 
easy to verify the absence of transmitters, explosives, bugs, cameras, etc.  
 In some contexts it may be desirable that tags not uniquely identify particular 
TLI. The monitored party may be concerned, for example, that valuable information 
could be gained if the monitoring nation were able to trace the deployment history of 
individual tanks. In this case the tag should simply indicate that a particular tank is 
an allowed tank, not that it is ‘allowed tank number 13647’. While this would rule 
out the use of ‘fingerprint’ tags (see below), it is possible to imagine tags that are 
identical under normal inspection but that incorporate anticounterfeiting measures 




The tagging systems must be extremely reliable in the full range of environments that 
the TLI might experience during storage, testing, training, repair and deployment. 
   
 
This may include extremes in temperature, vibration, humidity, radiation, etc., and 
some degree of deliberate abuse or tampering.  
 The tag must also have a very low false-alarm rate. False alarms not only 
undermine the mutual trust of parties which a treaty otherwise might engender, but, 
in sufficient number, they could create a background against which cheating would 
become easier. Designers of tagging systems should give some attention to reducing 
the possibility that the monitored party could deliberately act to increase the false-
alarm rate as a prelude to an episode in which illegal TLIs would appear in transit or 
in repair and then concealed. 
 The physical size and power requirements of the tag should be such that the 
normal functioning of the tagged TLI would not be impaired in any way. Once again, 
the use of open tag technologies combined with the random inspection of tags should 





The tagging system must not be excessively costly. But even if a tag cost as much as 
a new car (about US $15,000), the total cost of tagging the 142,200 tanks, artillery 
pieces, armored combat vehicles, aircraft and helicopters that NATO would like to 
permit under CFE would only be 2 billion US$—a small fraction of the hundreds of 
billions of dollars presently spent each year in maintaining forces. It seems very likely 
that an effective tagging systems can be designed within this constraint. 
 
III. Tag technologies 
 
The simplest type of tag is a number painted on the side of a TLI. For example, 
allowed tanks could be given numbers 00001 through 20000. (Engraved serial 
numbers or bar codes printed on bumper stickers would also work.) The number 
could then be read by an on-site inspector with field glasses, by low-flying aircraft, 
or, if large enough, by a photoreconnaissance satellite. The problem with such simple 
schemes is obvious: how would the monitoring party know that each number or bar 
code was unique? If inspection occurs at a distance, counterfeiting would be easy.  
 Even so, this simple tagging scheme can provide significant benefits by allowing 
the tank population to be sampled. For example, consider a population of 20,000 
allowed tanks distributed at 50 declared sites (400 tanks/site), which is illegally 
increased by 10 per cent by painting duplicate numbers on the excess tanks. (No one 
site has tanks with duplicate numbers.) Suppose that each week two sites are 
randomly chosen for inspection, and during the inspections 10 per cent of the tanks 
are randomly chosen for inspection. The chance that two of the tanks chosen would 
have identical serial numbers (and thus indicate a violation) is about 1.4 per cent; 
after 51 inspections (i.e., one year) the probably of detecting a violation would be 50 
per cent.2 Of course, larger violations would be detected more quickly. 
 




Tags that are manifestly unique, on the other hand, reveal the real power of tags 
because each observation of a tag would give unambiguous evidence of compliance 
or violation. If unique tags were used in the above example, there would be a 98 per 
cent chance of detecting a 10 per cent violation after a single inspection at only one 
site.3 
 Unique tags could be based on the observation of an unreproducible pattern or 
‘fingerprint,’ such as a three-dimensional image of fibers in a piece of fiberglass, the 
detailed roughness of a metal surface, or the reflection of light from flakes of glitter 
suspended in epoxy. The pattern itself could be public knowledge, since the principle 
of the tag is the unreproducibility of complex three-dimensional patterns. If the tag 
were an intrinsic characteristic of the TLI, duplication, spoofing, or swapping would 
be extremely difficult. The tag reading would be done with the same type of 
instrument used for the initial imaging, which would almost certainly require on-site 
inspection in close contact with the TLI. The drawback with all such schemes is that 
reading the tag would be time-consuming. The unique identification of TLI implied 
by this method could conceivably be objectionable to some parties. 
 A central requirement of fingerprint tags is that the pattern not change sig-
nificantly with the passage of time. For example, a hole could be drilled in the tank 
turret and the roughness of the surface at the bottom of the hole recorded; the surface 
could be preserved by screwing a cap into the hole. Tampering could be prevented by 
recording the ultrasonic signature of the resulting cavity.  
 In practice, tags would combine a simple serial number with a unique pattern. 
Assume, for example, that an inspector visits a site with 100 artillery pieces. 
Inspectors could verify the presence of a bumper sticker or hand-painted number on 
all the artillery pieces, but only a small fraction of these would be selected for a more 
detailed inspection of the tag to verify its authenticity. For example, a detailed 
photograph of the original hand-painted number could be compared with the number 
under observation. Alternatively, rubber castings could be taken of engraved serial 
numbers or fiber patterns in a bumper sticker could be recorded. Sandia National 
Laboratory in the United States has developed the ‘glint’ tag, in which glitter paint is 
applied over a serial number; illuminating the glitter from several different 
combinations of angles then produces a unique pattern that can be analyzed with a 




Another way to produce a unique tag is through the use of coded electronic signals. 
Electronic tags have many advantages: no pattern recognition is necessary—the tag 
could produce a simple ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer; this answer could be readily determined 
without direct access to the TLI on which it is emplaced; and the identity of a 
particular item need not be divulged. On the other hand, it will be much more difficult 
   
 
to negotiate a treaty that makes use of electronic devices rather than a simple tag or 
fingerprint. 
 Electronic tags could be authenticated by a direct connection to a local or remote 
console, or the tag could be equipped with a low-power infrared (IR) transponder 
(much like a television’s remote control), thereby allowing the tags to be queried from 
a few tens of meters away. Such tags are already in use in commercial assembly lines 
for inventory control. This would reduce the intrusiveness of OSI yet not provide a 
homing capability that would make the TLI vulnerable to attack. (If homing is a 
worry, the tags could be disabled during a crisis.) An extension of this idea would be 
to fly a pilotless airplane over the site to query tags.  
 If parties to an agreement do not object to tags that would identify individual 
TLIs, then the simplest electronic tag would work as the equivalent of a ‘one-time 
pad.’ Electronic access to the tag’s memory would only be allowed following the 
input of a special code unique to the particular tag and to the number of times it had 
been read previously. Each tag would report its serial number, the number of times it 
had been inspected and a unique secret number for that serial number and index. The 
secret numbers would be compared with a master list to authenticate the reading. 
Each secret number would be erased after it was read, and the series of secret 
numbers would be different for each tag. The monitored party could know all the 
information that was transmitted to and from the tag during this process and yet 
could not use this information to counterfeit tags. 
 If the tags cannot indicate their identity then their inputs and outputs must be 
identical; this is possible with modern cryptographic schemes. In either case the tag 
would have to be protected against nonelectronic means of discovering the series of 
secret numbers. For example, the chip could be shielded and provided with a 
membrane that would trigger a self-destruct mechanism if violated. (Similar 
mechanisms are used by the USA to protect nuclear weapons against unauthorized 
use.) In the case of unique tags, each tag need only protect its codes against 
tampering that does not leave any indication of misuse. In the case of identical tags, 
one must prevent even destructive means of discovering the secret codes, since a few 
tags could be sacrificed in a counterfeiting effort. 
 
IV. Tagging treaty-limited items 
 
The following examples are intended to show the weaknesses as well as the strengths 




Limits on the number of troops in Central Europe have been under discussion since 
the mid-1950s, as have schemes for monitoring such an agreement. Usually a 
continual presence of inspectors or remote monitoring equipment at checkpoints 
supplemented by occasional forays by human inspectors has been thought to be 
required. It is unclear, though, how the observation of an unusually large number of 
   
 
troops in a particular region would be anything more than an occasion for suspicions 
that could not be easily resolved. Conversely, the intrusiveness required to monitor 
agreed force dispositions might yield evidence of force weaknesses that in a crisis 
could make the military balance less, rather than more, stable. With a tagging system, 
however, the discovery of a single soldier without proper identification (i.e., without 
a tag) would be conclusive evidence of a violation, yet no information need be col-
lected about either the overall number of troops in the region or their disposition.  
 A tagging system for troops might work in the following manner. Suppose that 
limitations were imposed on the total number of active military personnel in each of 
several zones. At random or fixed intervals (say every six months) the monitoring 
party would supply enough ID cards (tags) so that the monitored party could issue 
one to each soldier in the zone. The ID cards would have a section where a thumb 
print could be registered within two or three days of the issue of the card.(Chemicals 
in the card could ensure that after this active period either the thumb print would no 
longer register or the card itself would indicate that a longer delay had occurred.) 
Every soldier in a controlled zone would be required to carry the appropriate ID card 
with his or her own thumb-print. Transfers of soldiers could be accommodated by the 
exchange of used ID cards for new ones. 
 With such a system in place, if an inspector ever found a soldier without a valid 
ID card, there would be a clear violation that could be investigated directly. 
Moreover, soldiers without valid ID cards might be aware of this fact themselves, 
and might chose to reveal this to inspectors. In most other verification schemes the 
total number of soldiers in the zone would be inferred from the number and types of 
units observed to be deployed there, or from some other set of imprecise measures 
that would not identify any specific individual as constituting a breach of the limit, 
even if they gave some general indication of a violation. 
 In practice this tagging scheme would have to be elaborated in great detail. Most 
obviously, there is the technical design of an ID card that could be personalized by 
thumb print within the required time period and not simply provided to troops just 
before an inspection. Since the cards would be provided by the monitoring party, and 
since inspectors could randomly recover a small fraction of the ID cards and return 
them to the laboratory for detailed analysis, occasional changes in the details of card 
technology could be used to ensure over time that there were was no counterfeiting or 
misuse of the tags. 
 The example suggests several other aspects of any tagging system. First, as 
implied by the mention of inspectors, tagging only works if there is some chance of 
observing the controlled items and the presence or absence of associated tags. In the 
case of ground troops, it is assumed that inspectors would be given fairly free access 
to transit routes, if not to all military bases. The personalized quality of the ID card 
would ensure that no single tag could be used to provide safe transit for a succession 
of soldiers, who would then disappear into uninspectable bases or other safe havens. 
 Finally, the example suggests that while tags can help ensure that a precisely 
defined limit is not exceeded, there are many potential verification problems for 
which tags would provide no help at all. If an inspector, for example, came upon an 
   
 
individual in uniform with an automatic weapon but no tag, it might be explained that 
the person was a police officer or some other quasi-military officer (e.g., a customs 
agent) and not a soldier at all. Moreover, soldiers travelling out of uniform and 
separately from their weapons on public transport or in cars may not be identifiable 
as such. Tagging cannot remedy imprecise definitions of what is controlled by an 
agreement. Only if the parties can agree on a clear definition of who is a ‘soldier’ can 
numbers of ‘soldiers’ be controlled. 
 
Tanks, artillery and armored combat vehicles 
 
Compared to limits on people, limits on hardware are in some ways easier and in 
some ways harder to verify by tagging. Certain major classes of military hardware 
have no civilian use and so cannot merely blend into the civilian landscape. Such 
specialized hardware includes tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles (ACVs), 
fighter-bombers, most bridging equipment and most munitions, but not jeeps, trucks, 
buses and transport aircraft. Observation of a tank leaves little question that it is a 
controlled item. For the same reason of singularity, though, close-up scrutiny of a 
soldier would reveal fewer military secrets than close-up scrutiny of an advanced 
weapon. 
 Several other differences make hardware harder to control through tags. First, 
there is less reason for any particular piece of hardware to emerge from hiding or to 
be involved in exercises and training. An opponent determined to violate an 
agreement could maintain a stock of tagged equipment to be used in peacetime 
operations and an untagged stockpile that would be kept out of view until shortly 
before the outbreak of hostilities. This problem is conceptually similar to the 
possibility of unknown stockpiles in an absolute ban on a class of weapons. A 
decisive difference, though, is that, in the case of a numerical limitation, troops would 
have the opportunity to train with the legal weapons of the same type. 
 Second, each hardware item has less of an essential identity than a person. With 
a thumb-print tag, one can be sure that the monitored party is not using a single tag 
and ‘transplantable thumbs’ to cover the transit of multiple people across inspected 
areas. With hardware, some care would have to be taken to design ways to take the 
equivalent of a fingerprint for each TLI, or to attach absolutely nonremovable tags to 
crucial pieces of the item. The complexity of the problem is indicated by the fact that 
a nonremovable tag on the fender of a tank would be of little help because the same 
fender could be unbolted and used seriatim to transfer large numbers of tanks to 
unknown storage warehouses. If the turret of a tank represented a large part of the 
value of the tank and the turret could not be easily removed or concealed, however, 
then a nontransferrable tag on the turret would suffice, because a limit on tank turrets 
would be equivalent to a limit on tanks. 
 As a technical matter, a nontransferrable, noncopyable tag for a tank turret is not 
hard to devise. As mentioned above, the surface roughness of a region of the turret 
(e.g., around an engraved serial number) would certainly be non-transferrable and 
difficult to copy, although it would also be difficult to authenticate and special 
   
 
precautions would have to be taken to prevent the fingerprint from changing with 
time. Electronic tags could use a capacitance, contact, or ultra-sound sensor, a fiber-
optic cable seal, or two electrically communicating devices on opposite sides of the 
turret, to ensure that once emplaced it could not be removed without providing a tell-
tale record. More simply, a limited amount of special epoxy glue made with unstable 
components and identifying trace elements or isotopes might be provided, or tags 
might be emplaced with ordinary glue and an ultrasound fingerprint of the resulting 
assembly recorded.  
 If several classes of tags were provided, or if the tags had serial numbers, then 
tagging could be used to control the number of tanks, artillery, or ACVs in each of 
several zones of interest, as well as the total in the overall region. The tags for each 
zone might be different colors and shapes, so that close inspection would not be 
required to ascertain that a tank was in an allowed area; only a small number of 
random close-in inspections would be required to verify that the tags were authentic. 
Such a scheme would be complicated, though, if tanks were routinely moved between 
zones. 
 If details about tank dispositions were not considered sensitive, the monitored 
party might simply be responsible for turning over to the monitoring party a roster of 
which tag serial numbers were in each zone prior to the beginning of each inspection 
period. Even if the dispositions were sensitive, the roster idea could be adapted using 
cryptographic techniques so that the monitored party could keep the overall roster 
secret while still providing assurance that any particular observed system was within 
a sublimit for a particular zone. Cryptographic or electronic means could be used to 
produce the equivalent of a system where the roster is deposited with a neutral and 
confidential judge who responds ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to queries of the form, ‘Is tank number 
1197 allowed in zone 2?’. 
 
Combat aircraft and helicopters 
 
Tags could find similar uses in monitoring aircraft and helicopters, although there are 
some important differences. Although tagging jet engines would probably be 
sufficient in the case of combat aircraft, it is not so obvious what component of a 
helicopter could be tagged, since there are no major external components. Occasional 
detailed inspections of fingerprint tags on the motor may be required to ensure the 
authenticity of simple tags on the housing. 
 The most obvious difference between aircraft and heavy ground equipment is that 
aircraft are far more mobile; they can transport themselves into or out of a zone in a 
matter of minutes or hours. It is difficult to see how human inspectors, with or 
without tags on the aircraft, could deal with this fundamental problem through on-site 
inspection. Remotely-monitored tags or tags read by automatic sensors at the end of 
runways may be the only solutions (see below). 
 
   
 
V. The role of tags in a verification system 
 
The role tags play in a verification system is mostly determined by how and when the 
authenticity of tags would be checked: during on-site inspections, through remote 
telemetry, or at natural choke points or artificial portals in the monitored country. 
 
Tags as an aid to on-site inspection 
 
The most straightforward way to use tags would be in conjunction with OSI. The use 
of tags would provide a clear way in which information gained during individual 
OSIs could contribute to an overall judgment concerning compliance with a treaty. 
Without tags, OSI cannot produce much direct information about the total number of 
TLIs deployed unless all sites are inspected simultaneously—an extremely costly and 
intrusive option.  
 With conventional OSI inspection schemes (i.e., without tagging), one might 
learn that 30 aircraft were at site A in January, 40 at site B in June and 50 at site C 
in December, but there would no way to conclude whether or not the total number of 
aircraft at all sites at any one time exceeded the permissible limit. A periodically 
declared roster of how many aircraft were at each site would reduce this problem, but 
such a roster would not give confidence about the completeness of the count at a 
given site. If all allowed aircraft were tagged, however, one could tell if every aircraft 
found at whatever facility was part of the allowed inventory.  
 Tags could be affixed to an essential part of each TLI during an initial round of 
baseline OSIs. If the anti-swapping and anti-counterfeiting measures were 
sufficiently foolproof, one could simplify the process greatly by passing out the 
allowed number of tags to the monitored party, whose own personnel would affix 
them. There should be strong incentives for the monitored party to affix the tags 
promptly and properly, since not to do so would increase the chance that an untagged 
system would be discovered.  
 During an OSI, inspectors would locate TLI and attempt to verify the 
authenticity of their tags and to verify that the tags had never been removed. If tag 
reading was difficult, as would be likely for fingerprint tags, a random sample of the 
tags could be checked. Procedures would have to be worked out for the return of a 
tag when a TLI was destroyed or otherwise removed from the inventory.  
 If the verification regime permitted inspections on short-notice at the option of 
the monitoring party, they could be timed to take maximum advantage of national 
intelligence capabilities. The movement of TLI into or out of the facility to be 
inspected could be monitored closely by NTM or by special cooperative measures 
just prior to the event. Even if an untagged TLI were never actually found during an 
OSI, tagging could force a cheater into more obviously suspicious behavior. 
Moreover, because untagged TLI would have to receive special handling at all times, 
tags might greatly increase the number of people who knew of a treaty violation on 
the part of their country, increasing the likelihood that the violation would become 
widely known. 
   
 
 The use of on-site checking of tags in providing evidence of cheating—indeed, 
the use of any type of OSI for this purpose—should not be oversold, because access 
to the evidence would always be in the control of the monitored party. Although it is 
true that the detection of a single untagged TLI would be evidence of a violation, the 
monitored party would be unlikely to allow an OSI when such a possibility existed. It 
would always be advantageous from the cheater’s perspective to make up excuses for 
delaying or denying an OSI rather than risk discovery of a ‘smoking gun.’ This may 
lead to a paradox of sorts, because if a tagging system were implemented the lack of 
a tag could become, in the eyes of the world community, the only acceptable evidence 
of a violation. 
 Thus, even though tags could provide unambiguous evidence of a violation with 
just a single observation, it is unlikely that this would ever happen during an OSI. 
The monitoring party probably would have to act on more ambiguous evidence, such 
as a refusal or delay of OSIs, surreptitious movement of TLIs out of declared 
facilities, tag tampering, or other suspicious behavior. However, tagging would have 
played a role in eliciting this suspicious behavior. Moreover, because of tagging’s 
relative efficiency in detecting violations, tags should reduce the likelihood that a 
country would decide to cheat in the first place (which is presumably the main 
purpose of verification). 
 Tags read on-site could be an excellent way to help build confidence between 
parties who are in compliance with an agreement. Because tags make inspections 
more efficient, they would have the virtue of minimizing the number of inspections 
required for a given level of confidence. Tags also could reduce the chance that false 
claims of treaty violation would be used for political reasons. 
 
Remotely monitored tags 
 
Supplementing OSI may be the most obvious role for tags, but it is by no means the 
only conceivable role that tags could play. In fact, certain verification regimes may 
be easier to negotiate if requirements for OSIs, especially when involving trained 
foreign personnel at sensitive military locations, are minimized. If tags could be read 
remotely, routine OSIs may not be needed. Three basic schemes using remote reading 
come to mind: the tag could transmit a continuous or intermittent signal, the tag could 
be provided with a two-way communication link, or the tag could record position 
information for later interrogation.  
 The most obvious remote sensing method is for every tag to transmit a coded set 
of high-frequency radio pulses. The location of the tag could then be determined by 
satellite receivers using time-of-flight measurements. The obvious drawback of this 
scheme is that one might be able to home on the beacons during an attack. The 
monitored party might be given the ability to switch off the transmitters in time of 
crisis to ease this problem, but such a system might have the paradoxical effect of 
aggravating a crisis since switching off the beacons could be taken to indicate that the 
monitored party was preparing for war. Even worse, there could be pressures to 
launch an attack while the beacons were still on, or shortly after they were switched 
   
 
off, when the approximate location of the TLI would still be known. The very 
necessity of making such decisions would distract leaders from dealing with more 
substantial issues.  
 A better plan would be to have the beacons emit signals randomly and 
infrequently in time, so one would never know the location of a large fraction of the 
tagged TLI at any one time. For example, an inventory of aircraft could be equipped 
with beacons that emitted a signal once every ten days. If the aircraft were moved 
once per day, then the monitoring party would only know the location of ten percent 
of the inventory at any one time.  
 In another remote-monitoring scheme, each tag would contain a receiver that 
recorded position information given by a navigation system. This system has the 
advantage that the quality of the location information could be controlled. If, for 
example, the resolution of the navigation system is too great, then the system’s output 
could be filtered to report only the number of a map square in which the tag could be 
found. After a period of time, the degraded information stored in the tags could be 
transmitted to the monitoring party. This transmission could be encrypted and 
security codes added to ensure the authenticity of the data. If the time delay were 
short (a few days), this idea would be operationally similar to the beacon scheme. 
Alternatively, the tags could be collected and sent back to the monitoring party and 
new tags issued. The tags themselves would then constitute a time-lagged data base 
of the position of every allowed aircraft. Tags of this type could be used to enforce 
regional limitations on TLI, such as the number of aircraft or tanks near the central 
front in Europe. 
 Of course, neither of these tagging systems could detect undeclared TLIs. The 
presence or absence of undeclared TLI would be verified by comparing the location 
information supplied by the tags to data collected by photoreconnaissance aircraft or 
satellites. For example, a photograph that showed a TLI at a location that was not 
recorded by any of the tags at that time would be evidence of a treaty violation.  
 These systems do not resolve all problems, however, and they create some of 
their own. First, they rely on NTM to detect violations. Since a cheater would be very 
careful not to expose untagged TLI to photoreconnaissance, the probability of 
observing a violation would be very small. One would probably have to depend on 
accidents to expose (or deter) cheating. Second, the system would place high 
demands on technology. It may not be possible to produce the type of tag described 
here—the receiver or beacon may simply be too large or require too much power. It 
also may not be possible to develop tags that are sufficiently reliable. If a photograph 
shows the location of a TLI but the tag records the position information inaccurately, 
then a false indication of a treaty violation would occur.  
 
Monitoring tags at choke points or portals 
 
Tags also could be used effectively at natural choke points or artificial portals—
places through which TLI must pass at least occasionally. As an example of a 
natural choke point, consider a rail spur that leads into an army depot or a warehouse 
   
 
where equipment is stored. Imagine, for example, that a train loaded with tanks on 
flat-bed cars was approaching a choke point equipped with sensors. If the tanks had a 
valid tag, the sensors could authenticate them (perhaps using a bar-code reader or the 
IR transponder mentioned above). If an untagged tank tried to pass through the choke 
point, other sensors, such as scales, video cameras with pattern-recognition software, 
or x-ray machines, would determine that the object could be a tank. The monitored 
party would then be required under the verification regime to allow more intrusive 
inspection to prove that the object was not a TLI. As another example, tag readers 
could be placed at the ends of runways; whenever sensors detected the landing or 
takeoff of a treaty-limited aircraft (acoustic or IR signatures might distinguish 
combat aircraft from other non-TLI aircraft), they could expect to read a valid tag on 
the underside of the plane. 
 If a natural choke point could not be found, one could be created by surrounding 
declared facilities with monitored fences which force the movement of TLIs through a 
gate or portal where they could be observed and counted. The declared facilities 
could be any combination of production, assembly, storage, testing, training, repair 
and deployment areas. The fence, or perimeter, would be a two-dimensional barrier 
around the monitored party’s facilities that could not be violated without detection. A 
wide variety of perimeter sensors could be used, including seismic detectors, 
microwave intrusion detectors, acoustic sensors, video and IR cameras, metal 
detectors, short-range radars, or pressure sensors. Possible monitoring devices at the 
portal might be video or IR cameras, weighing scales, x-ray, gamma-ray, neutron, or 
ultra-sound imaging devices, metal detectors and human inspectors. The 
perimeter/portal data could be transmitted to the monitoring party in a secure mode 
or interpreted by human inspectors stationed at the site. 
 Consider the case of a perimeter/portal system at an production or assembly 
plant. When a finished TLI was ready to leave the assembly plant, the monitored 
party could simply declare the TLI and the count of deployed systems would be 
increased. If the monitored party did not declare the TLI, monitoring devices at the 
portal would determine that the object could be a TLI. Unless further inspection was 
permitted to determine that the object was not a TLI, the monitored party would be in 
violation of the treaty when the TLI left the facility. 
 This system would have the advantage that declared TLI would not be inspected 
by intrusive devices at the portal. But in order to retain this advantage, TLI would 
have to be tagged before leaving the facility so that they could be returned for 
maintenance. Without tags, the monitoring party would have to inspect any returned 
TLI to ensure that the monitored party was not returning bogus TLI and replacing 
them with real TLI. Tags also would prevent covertly produced TLI from having 
access to declared production and assembly plants. 
 There are several disadvantages to perimeter/portal systems, especially when 
they are applied to a wide variety of declared facilities. First, both sides may be 
reluctant to allow the other to construct a perimeter composed of a wide variety of 
sensors around sensitive military areas and to allow intrusive inspections of any 
entering or exiting objects that the monitoring party claimed could be a TLI. The 
   
 
potential for gathering intelligence information that was not required for verification 
purposes would be obvious. Second, the perimeter/portal systems would be 
expensive—even more so if supplemented by a human presence. Third, such a system 
would necessarily be very complex, requiring perhaps hundreds of agreed rules 
governing the interpretation of data. Finally, perimeter/ portal systems probably 
would disturb the normal functioning of declared facilities. However, tagging 
provides a natural complement to perimeter/portal systems, allowing reduced 




Tags are a technical fix—a gimmick that will only aid the negotiating process to the 
degree that those technical difficulties with verification that tags could ameliorate are 
delaying the completion of treaties. Even if tags could make limits on certain TLIs 
easier to verify, there may be other barriers to agreement. In so far as this is the case, 
tags could become part of the problem instead of part of the solution—a source of 
endless detailed technical discussion that could be used to obfuscate more 
fundamental differences. An agreement incorporating tags would undoubtedly be far 
more detailed and more difficult to negotiate than one without tags, especially if 
electronic tags and/or remote-monitoring schemes are used. Although the United 
States and the Soviet Union have shown an ability to negotiate technically complex 
treaties, such complications should only be introduced when an agreement would be 
impossible without them. 
 The authors are optimistic that tags could be designed that meet all of the generic 
requirements outlined above: resistance to counterfeiting, spoofing, swapping, 
espionage, homing, etc. More work is needed to explore the feasibility of tagging 
concepts and to define the overall verification system of which tags could be a part, 
because the tag technology needed will depend much more on the verification regime 
as a whole than on any general requirements that tags must meet. Once a promising 
verification system is defined that requires a certain type of tag, then the development 
of specific tagging hardware could go forward productively. 
 In summary, while tags are not a panacea for the problems of monitoring 
numerical limits on concealable weapons, they could have much to offer if part of a 
carefully designed system. To be truly available for CFE verification, tagging 
systems will have to be the subject of detailed discussion among the parties, including 
parallel technical research and development on both sides.  
 
Notes and references 
                     
1 In the CFE Negotiation, TLIs include tanks, artillery, armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), combat aircraft and combat 
helicopters. The NATO position is that the number of these. TLIs in the Atlantic-to-the-Urals zone should be reduced 
from about 270 000 to 147 200 (40 000 tanks, 33 000 artillery, 60 000 ACVs, 10 400 aircraft and 3800 helicopters). 
According to the WTO, the current number of these items is about 350 000; in addition, they propose limits of 40 000 
for artillery, 56 000 for ACVs, 9400 for aircraft and 1.4-1.5 million combat personnel (Arms Control Today, vol. 20, 
no. 3 (Apr. 1990), p.5. 
   
 
                                                     
2 On average, about 36 legal and 4 illegal tanks would be selected during each inspection at each site. The probability 
that none of the four illegal tank numbers at one site would match the number on the first legal tank selected at the other 
site is  (20 000 – 4)/20 000, the probability that none would match the second legal tank is (19 999 – 4)/19 999, and so 
on. The probability that the excess tanks at both sites would have numbers that would match at least one of the numbers 
on allowed tanks at the other site is approximately 1 – [(19982 – 4)/19982]72 = 0.014 per inspection, and the probabil-
ity that n inspections would reveal a violation is 1 – (1 – 0.014)n. 
3 If there are 400 legal and 40 illegal tanks at a given site, then the probability of choosing a legal tank at random is 
(10/11). The probability of choosing 40 legal tanks at random (10 per cent of the legal inventory) is (10/11)40 = 0.022. 
